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This research speaks to developments in the conscientiousness literature regarding the 
consequences of being overly conscientious. Specifically, research has found that excessively 
conscientious individuals exhibit worse task performance than individuals with moderate levels 
of conscientiousness. The purpose of our study is to understand why and for whom high levels of 
conscientiousness may be detrimental. To this end, we incorporated resource allocation and 
general mental ability (GMA) to answer these questions. We conducted a laboratory study in 
which we manipulated the optimal level of resource allocation across multiple trials of a work 
simulation. Participants could maximize performance by matching actual resource allocation to 
the optimal level of resource allocation. This design allowed us to directly observe participants’ 
resource allocation decisions and vary the optimal level of resource allocation from low to high. 
We found that individuals with high conscientiousness and low GMA deviated most from the 
optimal level of resource allocation. Specifically, individuals with high conscientiousness and 
low GMA had a tendency to over-allocate resources. Downstream, the greater the deviation 
from the optimal level of resource allocation the worse performance was. Although 
conscientiousness may be beneficial in some circumstances, more is not always better. We 
demonstrated that high levels of conscientiousness can be detrimental to performance. This 
reduction in performance occurs when individuals are willing to invest a great deal of resources 
(high conscientiousness) but unable to recognize the optimal level of resource allocation (low 
GMA). Past research has provided limited insight into why highly conscientious individuals have 
been found to perform worse than individuals with moderate levels of conscientiousness. Our 
study extends this research by using an experimental design to demonstrate that 
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Conscientiousness is a Big-Five personality trait characterized by organization, adherence 
to rules, and achievement striving (Costa & McCrae, 1992; Roberts, Jackson, Fayard, Edmonds, 
& Meints, 2009). Meta-analyses have shown that conscientiousness is consistently and positively 
correlated with performance across a variety of jobs (Barrick, Mount, & Judge, 2001; Hurtz & 
Donovan, 2000; Meyer, Dalal, & Bonaccio, 2009). However, some researchers argue that the 
relationship between conscientiousness and performance may be curvilinear. Recent evidence 
supports the idea that individuals with moderate levels of conscientiousness exhibit better job 
performance than individuals with low or high conscientiousness (Carter et al., 2014; Le et al., 
2011; Wihler, Meurs, Momm, John, & Blickle, 2017). Ultimately, these studies suggest that 
there are situations in which higher levels of conscientiousness are not ideal. The goal of our 
study is to understand the conditions under which high conscientiousness may become 
problematic. To this end, we propose that the reductions in performance associated with high 
conscientiousness when compared to individuals with lower levels of conscientiousness arise 
from the misallocation of resources (e.g., time, effort).  
Effectively managing resources is often necessary for achieving high performance. Past 
research has found that individuals who lack motivation have a tendency to under-allocate 
resources (allocating fewer resources than the task requires) by choosing to abandon a task or 
failing to allocate the resources required to achieve high performance (Bandura & Cervone, 
1986; Carver & Scheier, 2001; Seo & Ilies, 2009). Similarly, problems can also emerge when 
highly motivated individuals over-allocate resources (allocating more resources than the task 
requires). Because performance is often multidimensional (Beck, Beatty, & Sackett, 2014), over-
allocating to one facet of performance can waste resources required for other aspects of 
performance. For example, among professors job performance frequently consists of both 
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research and teaching. A professor who spends too much time on teaching might do so at the 
expense of research. Because the multiple tasks that make up a job often compete for a shared 
pool of finite resources (e.g., hours in a workday) there is a need for individuals to allocate 
resources judiciously between competing demands. Thus, overall performance (performance 
across tasks that comprise an overarching job or goal) is compromised by over and under-
allocation of resources. Next, we consider how high conscientiousness might promote 
misallocation of resources. 
Conscientiousness affects performance through its impact on motivational states (Parker 
& Ohly, 2008) such as performance expectancies (Gellatly, 1996) and goal setting (Judge & 
Ilies, 2002). This leads highly conscientious employees to spend more time on-task (Biderman, 
Nguyen, & Sebren, 2008) and expend more effort towards work (Mount & Barrick, 1995; Yeo & 
Neal, 2008; Witt & Ferris, 2003) than less conscientious employees. Thus, it would seem that 
highly conscientious individuals are often willing to allocate a great deal of resources towards 
work. In general, this willingness appears beneficial as it leads conscientious workers to exert 
themselves and avoid under-allocating resources. However, when taken too far this practice may 
actually promote over-allocation. By investing heavily in one task, highly conscientious 
individuals may not have the resources required to achieve high performance on other tasks 
thereby reducing overall performance. However, we expect that there will be variance in 
individuals’ ability to recognize situations in which allocating a great deal of resources to a given 
task is not necessarily beneficial. That is, although highly conscientious individuals may be 
willing to invest resources this eagerness may lead them astray if they are not able to determine 
the amount of resources required. To this end, we consider general mental ability (GMA) as a 
key component in the process of recognizing the need to avoid over-allocating resources. 
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GMA is defined as a person’s ability to solve problems and perform complex information 
processing (Gottfredson, 1997). We propose that compared to individuals with low GMA, 
individuals with high GMA will more accurately judge how many resources are required to 
achieve high performance on a task. Over-allocation of resources may occur when there is high 
willingness (high conscientiousness) and low ability (low GMA). Determining why highly 
conscientious individuals might be misallocating resources is an important first step in 
understanding for whom high levels of conscientiousness might cause performance issues. Thus, 
we designed a laboratory study to examine the effects of conscientiousness and GMA on 
resource allocation. 
Because we are interested in the effect that conscientiousness and GMA have on resource 
allocation errors (i.e., allocating too many or too few resources), we designed an experiment that 
allowed us to manipulate the correct or “optimal” level of resource allocation. This optimal level 
of resource allocation represents the point at which just enough resources are allocated to achieve 
the highest level of performance without wasting resources. In our study, the optimal level of 
resource allocation was manipulated from low (high performance requires few resources) to high 
(high performance requires many resources) across multiple trials of a work simulation. We 
predict that both conscientiousness and GMA will moderate the relationship between the optimal 
level of resource allocation and actual resource allocation. Specifically, we expect individuals to 
over-allocate the most resources when conscientiousness is high and GMA is low.  
Optimal Resource Allocation 
 Different situations call for different levels of resource allocation. In some situations, 
overall performance is improved by investing a great deal of resources into the task-at-hand. In 
other situations, investing a great deal of resources into one task can be detrimental to overall 
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performance if it comes at the expense of performance on other tasks. This can occur when tasks 
have diminishing returns. The concept of diminishing returns refers to the idea that, after a 
certain point, further input will not increase one’s expected output. In other words, there exists a 
point after which allocating more resources to a task is unlikely to improve performance on that 
task. Similarly, the costs associated with a task (negative consequences of resource investment) 
also influence the optimal level of resource allocation. Next, we will unpack these two factors 
and discuss how they combine to create the optimal level of resource allocation. 
Diminishing Returns 
In many situations, as the level of resource allocation increases the magnitude of 
performance improvements may decrease until eventually plateauing (Norman & Bobrow, 
1975). Thus, there are often diminishing returns associated with tasks (Fredrick & Walberg, 
1980). For example, the more time a window washer spends washing a window the cleaner it 
will look. However, if this employee cleans for long enough he or she will eventually reach a 
point where the window appears to be spotless. Once this point is reached any additional time 
spent cleaning is time wasted (i.e., over-allocated) because further resource investment cannot 
noticeably improve performance. Thus, increases in resource investment may not always 
improve performance when there are diminishing returns. Furthermore, in many situations, there 
can be negative consequences associated with over-allocating resources.  
Costs 
Allocating resources towards a task can often carry potential trade-offs. If a task is unsafe 
(i.e., potential to cause bodily or property harm), risky (i.e., possibility of failure or loss), or 
competes with other tasks for resources (i.e., uses up resources required for other tasks) then 
higher levels of resource investment may incur greater costs. For instance, investing resources to 
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a task that fails to improve overall performance (e.g., a window washer polishing a spotless 
window) is a waste of resources which could be allocated to productive tasks (e.g., washing dirty 
windows). Furthermore, if the task is risky then unintended negative outcomes could outweigh 
any potential performance gains (e.g., an athlete who trains too hard and injures themselves). In 
sum, the costs associated with a task can influence the optimal level of resource allocation. In 
some circumstances, these costs may be so exorbitant that any resource investment is a bad idea. 
However, in other cases, the optimal division of resources may involve taking a calculated risk. 
Diminishing Returns, Costs, and Resource Allocation 
The optimal level of resource allocation is a function of the benefits and costs associated 
with resource allocation. Specifically, diminishing returns and costs combine to create the 
optimal level of resource allocation. These factors determine how high (investing a large amount 
of resources is associated with greater overall performance) or low (investing a small amount of 
resources is associated with greater overall performance) the optimal level of resource allocation 
is. For instance, the faster returns diminish the lower the optimal level of resource allocation will 
be. This occurs because, if returns diminish quickly, then the point at which the benefits 
associated with greater resource investment plateau will also occur more quickly. For example, a 
window washer would be able to spend more time on an especially dirty window compared to a 
relatively clean window before reaching a performance plateau. Similarly, as the severity of 
costs associated with a task increase the optimal level of resource allocation will decrease. All 
things being equal, the riskier a training routine is the less time an athlete should spend training 
to minimize the risk of incurring an injury and hurting future performance. Thus, the optimal 
level of resource allocation varies across tasks as a function of diminishing returns and costs.  
6 
 
Because overall performance is thought to be an aggregate of multiple tasks (Beck et al., 
2014) and resources are often limited (Beck & Schmidt, 2015) over-allocating resources to a task 
with diminishing returns can actually decrease overall performance by incurring undue costs. To 
illustrate, the more time the window washer wastes cleaning a spotless window the less time 
there is available to clean other windows. By wasting time on a task that fails to improve 
performance (i.e., washing a spotless window) the window washer may not be able to clean as 
many windows and overall performance will suffer. Thus, an individual who is better at 
matching actual resource allocation to the optimal level of resource allocation will have greater 
overall performance. In turn, the more an individual deviates from this optimal level of resource 
allocation the worse overall performance is expected to be. Issues of over-allocation may arise in 
individuals who are willing to allocate a high amount of resources (high conscientiousness) but 
unable to accurately recognize the optimal level of resource allocation (low GMA). 
Conscientiousness 
Researchers have often observed a positive relationship between conscientiousness and 
important contributors to performance such as goal setting, effort, and motivation (Barrick & 
Mount, 1991; Barrick, Mount, & Strauss, 1993; Gellatly, 1996; Judge & Ilies, 2002; Smillie, 
Yeo, Furnham, & Jackson, 2006). The general finding is that conscientious employees are 
achievement oriented workers who are motivated to invest a great deal of resources (e.g., effort, 
time, attention) into work. Furthermore, meta-analyses have observed a positive linear 
relationship between conscientiousness and performance (Barrick et al., 2001) across a variety of 
settings (Hurtz & Donovan, 2000). However, when taken to the extreme, researchers have 
demonstrated that the once beneficial facets of conscientiousness can become maladaptive 
(Samuel, Riddell, Lynam, Miller, & Widiger, 2012).  
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Excessively conscientious individuals have been described as compulsive perfectionists 
(Le et al., 2011), too meticulous (Tett, 1998), and overly detail oriented (Samuel & Widiger, 
2011). Because of this, researchers have theorized that the relationship between 
conscientiousness and performance may weaken at high levels (Moscoso & Salgado, 2004). In 
support of this, researchers have found evidence of nonlinear relationships between 
conscientiousness and performance (e.g., Carter et al., 2014; Wihler et al., 2017). Both Le et al. 
(2011) and LaHuis, Martin, and Avis (2005) observed a curvilinear inverted-U relationship 
between conscientiousness and performance with performance being highest at moderate levels 
of conscientiousness. This research challenges the idea that higher levels of conscientiousness 
are always associated with higher levels of performance. We propose that resource allocation 
may help to explain why increases in conscientiousness are not always beneficial. Excessively 
conscientious individuals may perform worse by over-allocating resources in situations which do 
not warrant a high level of resource investment.  
Although conscientious individuals are motivated to achieve high performance (Hart, 
Stasson, Mahoney, & Story, 2007) this eagerness may have unintended consequences. Perry, 
Hunter, Witt, and Harris (2010) argued that conscientiousness acts as a trigger which motivates 
individuals to expend effort towards pursuing goals. Ultimately, it seems that this general policy 
of investing a great deal of resources into work could be leading overly conscientious individuals 
awry by promoting over-allocation. An individual who allocates a high amount of resources 
regardless of the situation is going to perform poorly when the optimal level of resource 
allocation is low. Thus, simply being motivated to allocate a great deal of resources is 
insufficient. Achieving the highest level of overall performance requires both the willingness to 
allocate the required resources and the ability to recognize when it is a bad idea to allocate a high 
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amount of resources. To this end, we suggest that GMA corresponds to one’s accuracy at 
recognizing the optimal level of resource allocation.  
General Mental Ability 
Overwhelmingly, individuals with higher GMA tend to perform better across a wide 
variety of situations and jobs when compared to individuals with lower GMA (Hunter & Hunter, 
1984; Ree, Earles, & Teachout, 1994). Researchers have also found GMA to be positively 
associated with problem solving skill (Burns, Lee, & Vickers, 2006; Vickers, Mayo, Heitmann, 
Lee, & Hughes, 2004) and information processing speed (Sheppard & Vernon, 2008). Because 
of these findings, we expect individuals with high GMA to be more sensitive to the optimal level 
of resource allocation across situations. Individuals that are more intelligent should more 
accurately assess the situational factors (i.e., diminishing returns and costs) that create the 
optimal level of resource allocation when compared to less intelligent individuals.  
To accurately recognize the optimal level of resource allocation individuals must gather 
information from the environment and evaluate the potential costs and benefits associated with 
resource investment in a task. Because individuals with high GMA are naturally better at 
adapting to new situations (Lepine, Colquitt, & Erez, 2000), learning on the job (Hunter, 1986), 
and integrating information (Cokely & Kelley, 2009; Taylor & Dunnette, 1974) we predict that 
these individuals will be more sensitive to the optimal level of resource allocation across 
situations. Thus, we argue that individuals with higher GMA will more accurately recognize the 
optimal level of resource allocation.  
Can Do vs. Will Do: Conscientiousness × GMA Interaction 
To more accurately match actual resource allocation to the optimal level of resource 
allocation we contend that individuals need to possess both the willingness (conscientiousness) to 
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allocate the required resources and the ability (GMA) to recognize what the optimal level of 
resource allocation is. When GMA is low we predict that individuals with high conscientiousness 
will over-allocate resources. We expect this to occur because highly conscientious individuals 
tend to invest great amounts of time and energy into work and low GMA individuals tend to 
evaluate decisions less thoroughly than individuals with high GMA (Biderman et al., 2008; 
Cokely & Kelley, 2009; Mount & Barrick, 1995). Past studies examining this conscientiousness 
× GMA interaction on performance have had mixed success. Some researchers find support for 
an interaction (e.g., Di Domenico & Fournier, 2015; O’Reilly & Chatman, 1994; Perry et al., 
2010) whereas others only observe main effects (e.g., Mount, Barrick, & Strauss, 1999; Sackett, 
Gruys, & Ellingson, 1998; Van Iddekinge, Aguinis, Mackey, & DeOrtentiis, in press). Currently, 
it is unclear why these conflicting results exist. One explanation as to why past research has 
inconsistently observed this interaction may be that the joint effects of conscientiousness and 
GMA on performance are more nuanced than previously thought. By incorporating resource 
allocation, we hope to demonstrate that conscientiousness and GMA interact to indirectly predict 
performance via resource allocation.  
We predict that the relationship between optimal resource allocation and actual resource 
allocation will be moderated by conscientiousness and GMA. Specifically, there will be a three-
way interaction between the optimal level of resource allocation, conscientiousness, and GMA 
on actual resource allocation. We predict that individuals with high conscientiousness and low 
GMA will be worst at matching their actual resource allocation to the optimal level of resource 
allocation. This means that the relationship between optimal resource allocation and actual 
resource allocation will be weakest when conscientiousness is high and GMA is low. This will be 
manifested as a difference in slopes such that the slope will be shallowest when 
10 
 
conscientiousness is high and GMA is low. Additionally, when the optimal level of resource 
allocation is low, we expect that individuals with high conscientiousness and low GMA will 
over-allocate more resources than others. This will be manifested as a difference in intercepts 
such that the intercept will be highest when conscientiousness is high and GMA is low. We 
expect this to occur because individuals with high conscientiousness and low GMA should be 
motivated to invest a great deal of resources but lack the ability to identify situations in which it 
is not beneficial to do so. 
 To test our predictions we varied the optimal level of resource allocation across multiple 
trials of a work simulation. Our experimental design allowed us to test the effect that both 
conscientiousness and GMA had on resource allocation. Because we manipulated the optimal 
level of resource allocation, we were able to determine with certainty how well individuals were 
able to match actual resource allocation decisions to the optimal level of resource allocation. The 
relationship between actual and optimal resource allocation represents how well individuals are 
able to modify their behavior to fit the situation. Under and over-allocation of resources occurs 
when actual resource allocation deviates from the optimal level of resource allocation. This 
relationship is important because the more closely an individual’s actual resource allocation 







 Sixty-six undergraduate psychology students from a Canadian university participated in 
the study. Thirteen participants were excluded from the final analysis due to incomplete data 
caused by technical difficulties (four cases), failure to follow instructions (eight cases), and 
researcher error (one case). Thus, we present the results for the 53 participants who completed 
the study. Each participant completed 10 trials of the task resulting in 530 observations. The final 
sample was 72% female, 34% Asian, 32% Caucasian, 11% East Indian, and were on average 
18.94 years old (SD = 2.27). Participants were compensated with course credit and had the 
opportunity to earn cash rewards (see “Compensation Structure” section below). 
Task 
Participants performed a computerized work simulation adapted from Omodei and 
Wearing’s (1995) Networked Fire Chief (NFC) program. A labeled screenshot of the task is 
included in Figure 1. In the task, participants decided how many boxes to deliver to the storage 
shelves in each trial. Participants delivered boxes by using a computer mouse to pick up the 
forklift which could carry boxes to the shelves. The forklift could only hold one box at a time 
meaning participants needed to make multiple trips to the storage area to deliver multiple boxes. 
Participants completed 10 trials of this task. In each trial, there were 10 boxes available and 
participants could choose to deliver as many or as few of them as they wished. Each box 
delivered earned participants money but also carried a risk of losing money. The full 




 Every box delivered to the storage shelves gained participants money. The more boxes 
participants delivered the more money they could potentially earn. However, if delivering boxes 
only gained participants money then there would be no consequences associated with over-
allocation. Because our goal was to model real world resource allocation decisions, we needed 
variation in the optimal level of resource allocation. To this end, we incorporated diminishing 
returns and costs.  
Diminishing returns. In general, participants could earn more money by delivering more 
boxes. However, the amount earned for each box diminished at an incremental rate. Specifically, 
each box delivered in a trial gained participants $0.05 less than the box previously delivered. 
Participants earned $0.50 for the first box delivered in a trial, the second box delivered was 
worth $0.45, the third box $0.40, and so on until the last box which only earned participants 
$0.05. Because there were 10 boxes available participants could potentially earn up to $2.75 
($0.50 + $0.45 + $0.40… + $0.05) in each trial and up to $27.50 across the entire experiment by 
delivering all boxes. Thus, although each box delivered increased the total money earned the 
value of delivering boxes diminished over time.  
Costs. Although participants could gain money by delivering boxes, they could also lose 
money by causing accidents. As a simple way of modeling the potential costs of allocating 
resources, we added an element of risk to the task that varied across trials. Each time a box was 
delivered there was a chance that the delivery would cause an “accident”. Every time an accident 
occurred participants lost $1.40 from their earnings. The total amount gained or lost in each trial 
carried forward and was summed to determine the amount of money each participant received at 
the end of the experiment. It is important to note that participants were not given performance 
feedback (e.g., amount of money gained or lost in each trial) on a trial-by-trial basis. This was 
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purposefully done to ensure performance on previous trials did not influence participants’ 
resource allocation decisions on subsequent trials. Full feedback was provided to participants 
upon completion of the experimental trials. Thus, participants were not aware of the number of 
accidents they caused until the end of the study. 
Each time a box was delivered there was random chance (which varied by trial) that the 
delivery would cause an accident. Participants were explicitly told the odds of an accident 
occurring before each trial began. The odds of an accident occurring whenever a box was 
delivered varied between 5% – 50% (in 5% increments) by trial. Participants performed one trial 
of the task where the odds of causing an accident were 5%, one trial where the odds were 10%, 
15%, and so on up to 50%. This means that in some trials delivering boxes was relatively safe 
(e.g., 5% odds of an accident occurring) whereas in others delivering boxes was risky (e.g., 50% 
odds of an accident occurring). The order of these trials was counterbalanced. Each time a 
participant completed a delivery the computer would use a random number generator to 
determine whether that delivery had caused an accident. Because accidents were randomly 
determined, each delivery had an independent chance of causing an accident (i.e., the odds of an 
accident occurring never varied within trials). This means that it was unlikely but possible for 
participants to earn the full $2.75 (i.e., deliver all 10 boxes and cause no accidents) even in a 
high risk trial. Participants completed several knowledge checks regarding the compensation 
structure before performing the task. We used knowledge checks to ensure participants 
understood the training. In order to progress in the experiment participants had to answer 
multiple-choice questions about costs, payment, and how to operate the task. If any question was 
failed participants were given a chance to review the information and retry the question until the 
correct answer was given. 
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Optimal level of resource allocation. We defined the optimal level of resource 
allocation as the number of boxes that a participant would have to deliver to maximize his or her 
expected payout. Expected payout refers to the amount of money a participant would be expected 
to earn based on his or her behavior. We derived this number by calculating how much money a 
participant would be expected to earn when delivering X number of boxes (0 – 10) at Y odds 
(5% – 50%). For example, in a trial where the odds of causing an accident was 25% delivering 
four boxes would gain participants $1.70 ($0.50 + $0.45 + $0.40 + $0.35 = $1.70). However, 
because the odds of an accident occurring are 25% (i.e., one in four) delivering four boxes would 
be expected to cause one accident on average (25% odds of an accident occurring multiplied by 
four boxes) which would lose participants $1.40. Thus, expected earnings was calculated by 
taking the total amount gained by delivering boxes ($1.70) and subtracting the expected number 
of accidents (1) multiplied by the cost of an accident ($1.40). In other words, by delivering four 
boxes in a trial where the level of risk is 25% the participant’s expected earnings would be $0.30 
($0.50 + $0.45 + $0.40 + $0.35 - $1.40 = $0.30).  
We calculated expected earnings for each combination of boxes (1 – 10) and level of risk 
(5% - 50%). The number of boxes associated with the highest expected earnings for each level of 
risk became the optimal level of resource allocation. Figure 2 shows how expected earnings for 
each level of resource allocation vary across a selection of low, moderate, and high risk. This 
figure presents three levels of risk instead of the full 10 levels to simplify interpretation of the 
graph. For example, in a trial where the odds of causing an accident are 50% delivering even one 
box is expected to, on average, lose the participant more money than would be gained. Thus, the 
optimal level of resource allocation for a trial where the odds of causing an accident are 50% is 
to deliver 0 boxes. However, when the odds of causing an accident are only 5%, delivering boxes 
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is expected to result in a net gain up until nine boxes when there is a slight decrease in expected 
earnings. The optimal level of resource allocation ranged from 0 – 9 boxes depending on the 
level of risk. Participants were not explicitly told the optimal level of resource allocation because 
we were interested in whether individuals could recognize the optimal level of resource 
allocation. 
Procedure 
 Participants completed the study on lab computers. After providing informed consent, 
participants completed the GMA, conscientiousness, and demographic measures. Participants 
were then trained on the task via written instructions displayed on the computer. Specifically, 
participants were taught how to deliver boxes and the compensation structure for the experiment. 
This training included several knowledge checks testing participants’ understanding of the major 
components of the task. If at any time participants failed a knowledge check item they were 
given another chance to review the instructions and correct the mistake. Participants also 
completed several hands on trials which taught them the skills needed to perform the task. 
Finally, participants completed a full practice round of the task that combined everything they 
had previously been taught. 
Once training was completed participants then performed the 10 experimental trials of the 
task. It was made clear that performance on the experimental trials would determine the amount 
of money each participant would receive at the end of the study. Each experimental trial lasted 
two minutes. This time limit was pilot tested to ensure participants had sufficient time to deliver 
all 10 boxes. Participants received no feedback on money gained or lost until all 10 experimental 
trials were complete. Upon completion, the computer calculated the total amount of money 
earned by each participant and a researcher paid participants who had a positive total sum. 
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Participants with a negative total sum (i.e., individuals who lost more money than they earned) 
received no money. 
Measures 
GMA. A 16 item measure of GMA was adapted from Condon and Revelle’s (2014) 
International Cognitive Ability Resource. Participants had 10 minutes to complete the items. 
After 10 minutes, responses on the measure were automatically recorded and participants were 
advanced to the next measure. The test included logic, matrix, and mental rotation problems. 
KR-20 for this measure was .51. Although this seems low, it is important to note that GMA is a 
multidimensional construct comprised of several factors (e.g., math ability, pattern recognition, 
mental rotation). Even though these factors all load on GMA, it is reasonable for measures of 
GMA to have low reliability (Brunner & SÜβ, 2005).  
 Conscientiousness. Conscientiousness was measured using the Unfolding Five Factor 
Model (UFFM-I) Conscientiousness Scale developed by Carter et al. (2014). This 20 item 
measure looks at the orderliness and industriousness facets of conscientiousness and uses a 6-
point scale which ranges from 0 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The measure was 
designed to address the issues that Carter et al. (2014) had with how other personality tests were 
scored. Instead of the typical dominance model of measurement the UFFM-I Conscientiousness 
Scale uses an ideal point model. These two models differ in regards to how items are scored and 
the level of the trait that items are designed to assess. Dominance models use sum-scoring and 
assume that greater endorsement of items is associated with higher levels of the trait. However, 
this assumption precludes the possibility that individuals may disagree with an item because it 
suggests more or less of the variable than the person possesses (Carter, Dalal, Guan, LoPilato, & 
Withrow, 2017; Kang & Waller, 2005). Thus, it may be incorrect to assume that greater 
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endorsement of items is always associated with higher levels of a trait. Ideal point models do not 
carry this assumption as they account for the difficulty or extremity (i.e., how high on the trait an 
individual would need to be to fully endorse the item) of each item when scoring. For a more in 
depth review of the advantages of using an ideal point model see Carter et al. (2017).  
Participant responses on the UFFM-I Conscientiousness Scale are scored using a 
modified version of the GUMSCORE SPSS macro developed by Carter and LoPilato (2014). 
This macro uses item characteristic information (e.g., how “extreme” each item is) to calculate 
each participant’s trait conscientiousness score and then transforms those scores into standard 
deviations. Thus, a score of -1 on the UFFM-I Conscientiousness Scale would be interpreted as 
one standard deviation below the trait conscientiousness mean. Sample items include “I always 
go above and beyond what is expected” and “I wouldn’t describe myself as messy or clean; my 
organization is average”. 
 Optimal level of resource allocation. The optimal level of resource allocation was the 
number of boxes in each trial associated with the highest expected payout. We calculated this 
value using the formula described above in the “Optimal strategy” section of “Compensation 
structure”. Essentially, this formula calculates the expected gains and expected losses associated 
with each number of boxes delivered given the odds of an accident occurring. This value ranged 
from 0 – 9.  
Goals. A single item measure of resource allocation intentions was included to assess 
whether participants experienced any difficulties allocating resources during the task (e.g., 
running out of time, not understanding how to deliver boxes). Before each of the 10 experimental 
trials participants were asked “During the UPCOMING TRIAL my goal is to deliver __ number 
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of boxes”. Participants then used a dropdown menu to indicate the number of boxes they 





Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics including means, standard deviations, and 
intercorrelations. Because observations were nested within individuals, we implemented 
multilevel modeling (MLM; e.g., Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002) using SAS Proc Mixed (Singer, 
1998). We used MLM because using single- level regression techniques on nested data can 
downwardly bias standard errors.  
Before conducting our analyses, we first tested to ensure that participants were able to 
allocate the amount of resources they intended to allocate during the experimental trials. Because 
participants worked under a time limit (i.e., each experimental trial automatically ended after two 
minutes), we wanted to rule out the possibility that participants did not have sufficient time to 
allocate all of the resources they intended to allocate. We verified this by comparing participants’ 
resource allocation goal for each trial (i.e., the number of boxes they intended to deliver) to the 
amount of resources actually allocated within the trial (i.e., the number of boxes actually 
delivered). We observed a strong positive relationship between the resource allocation goals 
participants set and actual resource allocation (r = .91, p < .001). This strong correlation suggests 
that participants’ were in control of their resource allocation decisions during the experimental 
trials.  
Next, we tested to see if the optimal level of resource allocation was influencing 
participants’ resource allocation decisions. If participants were able to recognize the optimal 
level of resource allocation then we would expect participants to modify the actual amount of 
resources they allocated as the optimal level of resource allocation varied from trial to trial. 
There was a significant and positive relationship between optimal resource allocation and actual 
resource allocation (r = .56, p < .001). It seems that participants were sensitive to the optimal 
20 
 
level of resource allocation. In general, participants allocated more resources in trials where the 
optimal level of resource allocation was high and fewer resources in trials where the optimal 
level of resource allocation was low.  
Hypotheses Testing 
We predicted that conscientiousness and GMA would moderate the relationship between 
the optimal level of resource allocation and actual resource allocation. Specifically, we predicted 
that individuals with high conscientiousness and low GMA would perform the worst at matching 
actual resource allocation to the optimal level of resource allocation. As shown in Step 3 of 
Table 2, there was a significant three-way interaction between the optimal level of resource 
allocation, conscientiousness, and GMA on actual resource allocation. This interaction is plotted 
in Figure 3. This figure provides initial support for our contention that individuals with high 
conscientiousness and low GMA would be the worst at matching their actual resource allocation 
to the optimal level of resource allocation. The graph shows that the relationship between 
optimal and actual resource allocation appears to be weakest for individuals with high 
conscientiousness and low GMA. Additionally, when the optimal level of resource allocation is 
zero (i.e., optimal strategy is to allocate no resources), individuals with high conscientiousness 
and low GMA also seem to be over-allocating more resources than other individuals.  
 To determine if the differences in slopes observed were meaningful we tested whether 
the slope for individuals with high conscientiousness and low GMA was significantly different 
from the other slopes. In line with our predictions, individuals with high conscientiousness and 
low GMA had the weakest slope between optimal resource allocation and actual resource 
allocation (γ = .24, 95% CI [.15, .34]). The slope for individuals with high conscientiousness and 
low GMA was significantly lower than individuals with low conscientiousness and low GMA (γ 
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= .48, 95% CI [.40, .56]), individuals with low conscientiousness and high GMA (γ = .62, 95% 
CI [.52, .71]), and individuals with high conscientiousness and high GMA (γ = .63, 95% CI [.55, 
.70]). Thus, we found support for our prediction that individuals with high conscientiousness and 
low GMA were worst at matching their actual resource allocation to the optimal level of resource 
allocation. A display of the slopes and confidence intervals can be found in Figure 4. 
 Similarly, we also predicted that individuals with high conscientiousness and low GMA 
would over-allocate resources more than other individuals. We tested this prediction by 
examining whether there were significant differences among the intercepts at both the low 
(optimal level of resource allocation is zero) and high (optimal level of resource allocation is 
nine) levels. When the optimal level of resource allocation was low individuals with high 
conscientiousness and low GMA had the highest intercept (B0 = 4.83, 95% CI [3.73, 5.93]). The 
intercept for individuals with high conscientiousness and low GMA was significantly higher than 
individuals with low conscientiousness and low GMA (B0 = 3.65, 95% CI [2.79, 4.52]), 
individuals with low conscientiousness and high GMA (B0 = 2.93, 95% CI [1.83, 4.02]), and 
individuals with high conscientiousness and high GMA (B0 = 2.2, 95% CI [1.32, 3.08]). This 
means that individuals with high conscientiousness and low GMA allocated significantly more 
resources than other individuals when the optimal level of resource allocation was low. 
Additionally, we conducted the same analysis to see if there were any differences in intercepts 
when the optimal level of resource allocation was high. However, no significant differences were 
observed. This means that participants did not significantly differ in their resource allocation 
decisions when the optimal level of resource allocation was high. A graph displaying the 
intercepts and confidence intervals when the optimal level of resource allocation is low and when 
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the optimal level of resource allocation is high can be found in Figure 5 and Figure 6 
respectively. 
Overall, the nature of the three-way interaction between the optimal level of resource 
allocation, conscientiousness, and GMA on actual resource allocation was as predicted. The 
pattern of results supported our general hypothesis that individuals with high conscientiousness 
and low GMA performed worst at matching their actual resource allocation to the optimal level 
of resource allocation. The relationship between optimal and actual resource allocation was 
weakest for individuals with high conscientiousness and low GMA. Additionally, we also found 
that individuals with high conscientiousness and low GMA over-allocated resources significantly 
more than other individuals in situations where the optimal level of resource allocation was low. 
Auxiliary Analyses 
We operationalized performance in our study as the amount of money participants earned 
on the task. Based on how we designed the task, individuals who were better at matching their 
actual resource allocation to optimal resource allocation should have the greatest performance 
and earn more money than individuals who did a poorer job of matching actual resource 
allocation to optimal resource allocation. To verify this, we calculated the slope of the 
relationship between actual and optimal resource allocation for each participant. If the slope was 
positive, then the stronger the slope the better the participant was at matching actual resource 
allocation to the optimal level of resource allocation. A negative or weak slope reflects a poor 
match between actual and optimal resource allocation. Next, we ran a regression with slope 
predicting performance on the task. As predicted, we found a positive relationship between slope 
and performance on the task (b = 888.14, SE = 181.23, p < .001). This supports our argument 
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that we were able to design a task in which allocating resources optimally resulted in greater 
performance.  
Additionally, we also tested the above prediction using intercepts instead of slopes. When 
the optimal level of resource allocation is zero any amount of resource allocation would result in 
over-allocation. We predicted that the higher a participants’ intercept when the optimal level of 
resource allocation is low (i.e., zero) the lower performance should be. We ran a regression using 
each participant’s intercept at zero to predict performance on the task. As predicted, we found 
that there was a negative relationship between intercept and performance on the task (b = 
−124.57, SE = 19.90, p < .001). This provides further support that achieving high performance 
on the task requires a match between actual resource allocation and optimal resource allocation.  
To determine whether slope or intercept was the better predictor of performance we 
conducted one final regression with both slope and intercept predicting performance. When 
analyzed together only intercept (b = −107.77, SE = 32.61, p = .002) and not slope (b = 177.59, 
SE = 272.23, p = .517) was a significant predictor of performance. This suggests that intercept 
better predicts performance in our study. In sum, these auxiliary analyses demonstrate that the 
experimental task we designed was able to model the relationship between resource allocation 
and performance that we sought to model. As intended, achieving high performance on the task 






 Recent research has found that higher levels of conscientiousness may not always be 
beneficial for performance (e.g., Carter et al., 2014; LaHuis et al., 2005). Although this research 
established that there are can be downsides to extreme conscientiousness, it provided little 
insight into why this might be. To address this limitation, we designed a study to test the 
conditions under which high levels of conscientiousness can become problematic. Our results 
support previous research which finds that higher levels of conscientiousness do not always 
improve performance. However, we also provide new insights into understanding this effect. We 
demonstrated that high conscientiousness promoted deviation from the optimal level of resource 
allocation for individuals with low GMA. Specifically, individuals with high conscientiousness 
and low GMA were most likely to over-allocate resources during a work simulation. We found 
that individuals with high conscientiousness and low GMA had the weakest slope between actual 
and optimal resource allocation when compared to others. Additionally, we demonstrated that 
this weak slope was a function of over-allocation as individuals with high conscientiousness and 
low GMA allocated significantly more resources than others did when the optimal level of 
resource allocation was low. In turn, over-allocating resources had a downstream negative effect 
on performance. Thus, our findings suggest that individuals who are highly motivated but unable 
to recognize the optimal level of resource allocation perform worse than others do because of 
their tendency to over-allocate resources. This is an important finding as it advances research on 
the negative effects of conscientiousness (e.g., Carter et al., 2014; Le et al., 2011) by providing 
context for whom high levels of conscientiousness may be detrimental to performance and how 




 Previous theorizing on the relationship between conscientiousness and performance 
generally agreed that increases in conscientiousness improve performance across a variety of 
domains (Barrick et al., 2001). However, some researchers challenged this position by arguing 
that conscientiousness may not always be beneficial to performance (Carter et al., 2014; Samuel 
et al., 2012). We lend further support to this view by replicating the finding that high levels of 
conscientiousness can be detrimental to performance. Additionally, we extend this research by 
identifying one potential mechanism for how these negative effects can occur. An important 
contribution we make to this literature is to demonstrate that, for individuals with low GMA, 
high levels of conscientiousness can be detrimental to performance by promoting over-allocation 
of resources. This finding provides a theoretical base for future research to build upon when 
studying the relationship between conscientiousness and performance.  
 Another contribution we make is in connecting research on conscientiousness and GMA 
with the resource allocation literature. Although there has been some initial research on the role 
conscientiousness plays in resource allocation (e.g., Sun, Chen, & Song, 2016) no study has 
considered the combined effects of conscientiousness and GMA on resource allocation. Our 
study demonstrates that both of these factors have important implications for how individuals 
make resource allocation decisions. Incorporating conscientiousness and GMA into the literature 
on resource allocation provides a more complete picture of the process individuals use when 
allocating resources. Thus, by considering the joint effects that conscientiousness and GMA have 
on resource allocation we advance theory by identifying an important determinant of resource 
allocation. Both GMA and conscientiousness interact to influence the resource allocation 
decisions individuals make. 
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Our results also speak to the debate over the relationship between conscientiousness, 
GMA, and performance. Past research has suggested that conscientiousness and GMA should 
interact to predict performance (Sackett et al., 1998; Vroom, 1959). The logic of this 
hypothesized relationship is that how well an individual performs depends on the joint effects of 
ability (GMA) and motivation (conscientiousness). An individual can only achieve high 
performance if he or she possesses both the motivation to expend effort and the ability to 
perform well. However, empirical support for this relationship has been inconsistent (e.g., Mount 
et al., 1999; Perry et al., 2010; Van Iddekinge et al., in press). In the current study, we observed 
that conscientiousness and GMA interact to indirectly predict performance via resource 
allocation. This element of resource allocation may help to explain the inconsistent findings from 
previous research. Although not definitive, the current study provides initial support for the idea 
that the hypothesized conscientiousness by GMA interaction on performance may be more 
nuanced than previously thought. Further research is required to unpack the role resource 
allocation plays in this relationship and to determine whether our results can generalize to the 
workplace contexts previously studied (e.g., Sackett et al., 1998). 
Practical Implications 
 The results of this study have practical implications for managers, teachers, and anyone 
in a supervisory role. Individuals who must manage subordinates should be mindful of the 
negative effect that high levels of conscientiousness and low levels of GMA can have on 
resource allocation and performance. Using the results of our study to identify which employees 
are most likely to over-allocate resources could help supervisors diagnose and address 
performance issues. By identifying which subordinates are most likely to over-allocate resources, 
supervisors could tailor their management strategies to address this issue for these individuals. 
27 
 
Understanding how individuals tend to allocate resources could affect the goals, feedback, or 
norms a supervisor communicates to his or her subordinates. In more extreme cases, supervisors 
may seek to curtail this issue of over-allocation by having subordinates form implementation 
intentions related to resource use or by limiting the autonomy that high risk groups (i.e., 
individuals with high conscientiousness and low GMA) have in making resource allocation 
decisions. In general, we expect that a greater understanding of which individuals are most likely 
to over-allocate resources would help supervisors to better manage their subordinates. More 
research is required to understand how supervisors might implement interventions (e.g., 
feedback, goal setting) to reduce the over-allocation of resources across a variety of settings. 
 Our study also has several implications for employee selection. GMA and 
conscientiousness are two indicators of performance commonly used in employee selection and 
assessment (Behling, 1998). However, some practitioners have advocated against using 
measures of GMA when hiring (Briner & Rousseau, 2011) with the majority believing 
conscientiousness to be a better single indicator of performance (Rynes, Brown, & Colbert, 
2002). Our results demonstrate that the joint effects of conscientiousness and GMA matter when 
predicting performance. Issues may arise when organizations seek to hire highly conscientious 
employees but disregard GMA. Organizations that use this strategy run the risk of hiring highly 
conscientious individuals with low GMA who will over-allocate resources and not perform as 
effectively as their high GMA counterparts perform. Although researchers have advocated that 
organizations should measure GMA from a validity standpoint (Rynes et al., 2002), we bolster 
this argument by demonstrating that there are unique problems associated with excluding 
measures of GMA. Because of the indirect effect that conscientiousness and GMA have on 
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performance via resource allocation, it may be detrimental for organizations to maximize 
conscientiousness in employees without considering GMA.  
Strengths, Limitations, and Future Directions 
 The laboratory approach used in the current study has several strengths over other 
designs. Using a laboratory paradigm allowed us to unobtrusively measure the resource 
allocation decisions made by participants. The ability to directly observe these behaviors in a 
controlled environment is a strength of our study. Additionally, our use of an experimental 
design granted us a level of control that would be difficult to achieve using a non-experimental 
design. With this high level of control, we were able to vary the optimal level of resource 
allocation from low to high. Because of this, we could make stronger inferences regarding 
causality than could be made using other designs. Thus, we were able to demonstrate that 
conscientiousness, GMA, and the optimal level of resource allocation can affect actual resource 
allocation. However, the extent to which this effect will generalize to applied settings requires 
further research. 
Next, we recognize several limitations of the current study that provide opportunities for 
future research to address. First, although our use of a work simulation provided a high level of 
control it comes at the cost of ecological validity. One could make the argument that several 
aspects of the task do not match the experience of employees in the workplace. For instance, we 
operationalized “costs” in the current study as the money participants could lose during the task. 
However, the costs associated with under or over-allocating resources at work are not always 
monetary. An employee who misallocates resources could face a variety of negative outcomes 
which range in severity including poor performance reviews, demotion, or termination. Although 
the current study does not capture the full range of costs as they exist in the workplace, we would 
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argue that varying the type or severity of costs should not change the underlying effect we 
observed. The effect of costs on behavior occurs through the optimal level of resource allocation. 
Thus, varying costs should only affect behavior insofar as it influences the optimal level of 
resource allocation. Similarly, in the current study we manipulated the optimal level of resource 
allocation by varying costs and holding diminishing returns constant. Theoretically, there is no 
reason why varying diminishing returns as opposed to costs would change the results we 
obtained but it is a question that should be answered empirically. We invite future research to 
address these concerns by replicating our findings using other types of costs and varying 
diminishing returns.  
A second limitation of our study design is related to how we communicated information 
about the optimal level of resource allocation to participants. Given that our intention was to 
control the optimal level of resource allocation we simplified costs and diminishing returns to 
their most basic elements. This allowed us to easily communicate information about the optimal 
level of resource allocation to participants but may not reflect how individuals receive this 
information in the workplace. In the current study, we explicitly gave participants absolute 
knowledge about the costs and benefits associated with their behavior. We provided this 
information to ensure internal validity of our optimal level of resource allocation manipulation. 
However, in the workplace it is unlikely that an employee would receive such absolute 
information about the costs and benefits associated with resource allocation. Thus, the current 
study may not fully capture the ambiguity involved in making resource allocation decisions in 
the workplace. Future research should examine how uncertainty surrounding the optimal level of 




 The current study provides insight into the effects of conscientiousness and GMA on 
resource allocation. In general, conscientiousness can be beneficial as it promotes a high level of 
motivation, effort, and leads individuals to invest a great deal of resources into work (Barrick et 
al., 1993; Gellatly, 1996; Judge & Ilies, 2002). However, this strategy of investing a great deal of 
resources can become problematic when broadly applied to situations in which a high level of 
resource investment is unnecessary or unwarranted. Specifically, individuals with low GMA may 
fail to consider the optimal level of resource allocation when making resource allocation 
decisions. Thus, highly conscientious individuals with low GMA may end up over-allocating 
resources. This occurs because these individuals are motivated to invest a great deal of resources 
but unable to recognize the optimal level of resource allocation. Ultimately, we find that this 
over-allocation of resources has a negative downstream effect on performance.  
The results of our study expand upon previous work to highlight the circumstances under 
which high levels of conscientiousness can become detrimental to performance. It is our hope 
that these findings will provide researchers with new ways to understand the relationship 
between conscientiousness and performance. Additionally, supervisors could utilize the insights 
into conscientiousness, resource allocation, and performance that the current study provides to 
better identify potential resource allocation issues in subordinates. These findings could allow 
managers, teachers, and anyone in a leadership role to more effectively manage their 
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Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations of All Study Variables 
 
Note: Optimal = optimal level of resource allocation, Actual = actual level of resource allocation. 
n = 530 observations nested within N = 53 individuals. 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4
1. Optimal 3.45 3.23 1.00
2. Conscientiousness −.25 .53 .00 1.00
3. General Mental Ability 5.83 1.82 .00 .22 1.00




Interaction of Optimal Resource Allocation, Conscientiousness, and GMA on Actual Resource 
Allocation 
  
Note: Opt = optimal level of resource allocation, Consc = conscientiousness, and GMA = general 
mental ability. Because a true value for R2 could not be calculated we estimated R2 using the 
squared correlation between the predicted and observed outcomes (Northcraft, Schmidt, & 
Ashford, 2011).  n = 530 observations nested within N = 53 individuals. 
  




Step 1: Main Effects .33 −
   Opt .51 .02 <.001
   Consc −.15 .47 .742
   GMA  −.21 .14 .124
Step 2: Two Way Interactions .36 .03
   Opt .07 .08 .394
   Consc 1.85 1.54 .236
   GMA −.53 .16 .001
   Opt × Consc −.11 .04 .011
   Opt × GMA .07 .01 <.001
   Consc × GMA  −.28 .25 .272
Step 3: Three Way Interaction .37 .01
   Opt −.05 .09 .569
   Consc 3.15 1.61 .056
   GMA  −.59 .16 <.001
   Opt × Consc  −.49 .14 <.001
   Opt × GMA .09 .01 <.001
   Consc × GMA     −.5  .26 .063




Figure 1. Labeled screenshot of experimental task shown to participants.





Figure 2. Graphical depiction of how gains, diminishing returns, and costs create the optimal 
level of resource allocation. Unfilled markers indicate the optimal level of resource allocation. At 
the 5% Risk the optimal level of resource allocation is nine boxes and expected pay is $2.07. At 
the 20% Risk the optimal level of resource allocation is five boxes and expected pay is $0.60. At 
the 50% Risk the optimal level of resource allocation is zero boxes and expected pay is $0.00. 
  




Figure 3. Interaction between optimal level of resource allocation, conscientiousness, and GMA 








































Optimal Resource Allocation (in boxes) 
Low Consc, Low GMA
High Consc, Low GMA
Low Consc, High GMA
High Consc, High GMA




Figure 4. Slopes with 95% confidence intervals. Error bars represent standard errors. High = +1 





























Figure 5. Intercepts at lowest optimal level of resource allocation (0) with 95% confidence 



































Figure 6. Plot of intercepts at highest optimal level of resource allocation (9) with 95% 
confidence intervals. Error bars represent standard errors. High = +1 SD, Low = −1 SD. N = 53. 
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